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THE SCOPE OF HERMENEUTICS IN NATURAL SCIENCE

PATRICK A. HEELAN
Georgetown University
Washington, DC 20057

Abstract: Hermeneutics or interpretation is concerned with the generation,
transmission, and acceptance of meaning within the lifeworld and was the
original method of the human sciences stemming from F. Schleiermacher and W.
Dilthey. Hermeneutic philosophy refers mostly to M. Heidegger’s. This paper
addresses natural science from the perspective of Heidegger’s analysis of
meaning and interpretation. Its purpose is to incorporate into the philosophy of
science those aspects of historicality, culture, and tradition that are absent from
the traditional analysis of theory and explanation, to re-orient the current
discussion about scientific realism around the hermeneutics of meaning and truth
in science, and to establish some relationship between the current philosophy of
natural science and hermeneutical philosophy. The paper has particular
relevance to the history and social studies of science and technology.

Introduction
The title of Heisenberg’s momentous paper of 1925 that presented quantum
mechanics to the world was ‘About the quantum theoretical re-interpretation of
kinematical and mechanical relationships’ (Heisenberg 1925). The title reflected
Heisenberg’s view that quantum mechanics was not a new solution within the old
mechanics, but a new mechanics that was sensitive to the intrinsic dependence of
quantum objects on measurement interactions and where measuring instruments,
unlike the quantum objects they measure, followed ‘classical physics’ rather than
the new quantum physics. This, he said, was a re-interpretation inspired by the
way Einstein in 1905 solved the Lorentz and Fitzgerald problem of apparent
length contraction and apparent time dilation by the apparently simple expedient
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of re-interpreting the character of space and time, taking the apparent lengths and
intervals to be the real lengths and intervals.1
I am not going to defend
Heisenberg’s or Einstein’s notion of interpretation, but to explore at a
philosophical level the sense in which interpretation is at work in all of physics
and other experimental science, and to contribute to opening up a new
philosophical -- and metaphysical -- perspective on physics that was possibly
foreshadowed by Einstein and Heisenberg in their attempt to make sense of their
discoveries.2
Interpretation -- alternatively, hermeneutics -- belongs to the method and
thinking of those other sciences, the human sciences, among which are to be
counted history, classics, philology, linguistics, anthropology, psychology,
sociology, biblical theology, jurisprudence, and philosophy. Most of these
sciences have diversified over time, but I mean them insofar as they have retained
their original focus on cultural meaning and its transmission, rather than on
physics’ explanation, prediction, and control. In Europe the human sciences have
always been as revered as the natural sciences and were included in any listing of
the sciences; in German, they were ‘Geisteswissenschaften,’ in French, ‘les
sciences humaines.’ This describes a tradition of scholarship oriented towards the
‘space’ of shared and transmitted meanings within the context of the social
historical lifeworld, its characteristic method being that of the (so-called)
hermeneutical circle (or spiral) with multiple foci, 1. on the discovery,
articulation, and fulfillment of meaning in the lifeworld, 2. on the historical
transmission of meaning, and 3. on the transformation of meaning under the
historical conditions of its transmission.3 I aim to look at the natural sciences
from the philosophical way of thinking originally developed to support the human
sciences.
The hermeneutic orientation is contrasted with the explanatory tradition which
in the English-speaking world is simply called ‘science.’ Explanatory method
aims at the construction of a mathematical model comprising measurable
(theoretical) variables, to be accepted or rejected by reason of its ability under
laboratory circumstances to predict and control the causal outcomes of assigned
initial conditions. Such is in general the methodological profile of the natural
sciences.
Not that the human sciences have to be exclusively interpretative, nor the
natural sciences exclusively explanatory. In fact, during the past fifty years, the
human sciences have taken a strong turn towards the explanatory orientation
under the name of ‘empirical’ or ‘cliometric’ social sciences, though with
disappointing accomplishment on the whole in relation to predictive power. As
for the natural sciences, the search for an inherent cultural meaning has come
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predominantly (but not exclusively) from outside the sciences, in particular from
religious interests looking for traces of divine action in the world, large and small.
In recent years, however, scholars have begun to use both hermeneutic and
empirical social science methods to study the actual and historical profiles of
activity of communities of scientific researchers. One outcome was the strong
claim that the march of science was not continuous but rather characterized by
abrupt theoretical discontinuities or (what T.S. Kuhn called) ‘scientific
revolutions.’ Similar discontinuities were shown to exist even among co-existing
explanatory theories.4 Other studies have convincingly uncovered a diversity of
internal and external cultural goals to scientific research.5 The outcome of this
research has brought philosophers of science to a moment of reflection about the
identity and goals of explanatory science. This perplexity has affected the status
of the natural sciences in a special way since, because of their success, they were
assumed to provide a privileged route to knowledge, a route that became
exemplary for all the other sciences, and even for the philosophy of science itself.
The received tradition of the philosophy of science is a philosophy of modern
origin with roots in the classical philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. Among its
distinguished modern forbears were Descartes, Bacon, Hume, Leibniz, and Kant.
In this century it became a specialized branch of philosophy under the influence
of Russell, the Logical Positivists and Logical Empiricists of the Vienna and
Berlin Circles, and today it is represented by a galaxy of honored names among
whom it would be invidious to make a selection.6 This is the tradition that is
presently now deeply divided over how to respond to the picture of scientific
culture newly laid out by the best scholarship in the empirical social and historical
sciences.7 The story they tell about the natural sciences can hardly be reconciled
with the noble ideals of knowledge and reality stemming from the philosophical
tradition just mentioned. Whence comes an embarrassing dilemma: either natural
science is not worth the name of ‘knowledge’ and deserves no more than to be
called ‘useful opinion,’ or the philosophical analysis of knowledge and reality
needs to be revisited and reviewed.
I suppose that most philosophers of science think they will eventually find a
way out of this dilemma that preserves for the natural and other
theoretic/empirical sciences a privileged epistemological and ontological status.
Much of the enormous cultural prestige of natural science in modern societies has
come from its Faustian powers, but even more derives from the noble-- perhaps,
mythic-- belief that science helps us to see Nature, perhaps as God sees it, in a
way unmixed with human error, construction, or superstition. If the dilemma can
be resolved, it surely will be done with the brilliance of the talent available.
My goal, however, in this paper is to revisit and review the natural sciences
from the perspective of hermeneutic philosophy in order to get a clearer or at least
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a different assessment of the status of theoretical explanatory knowledge and its
relation to the lifeworld, and possibly also to get some sense of how the current
logical empiricist and the hermeneutic traditions relate to one another with respect
to the short term explanatory goals of science and the long term goals of
knowledge.
Just as the philosophy of science has its own fundamental literary corpus, so
interpretative or hermeneutical philosophy has its own basic corpus. This
comprises works by F. Schleiermacher, E. Husserl, M. Heidegger, W. Dilthey, M.
Merleau-Ponty, H.-G. Gadamer, P. Ricoeur, and only in part, their structuralist,
post-structuralist, and critical theoretic successors who remain strongly tied to the
empiric/theoretical tradition.8 The principal author used in this essay is
Heidegger. I include a working bibliography here because Heidegger is not often
found cited in the philosophy of science.9 Though these writers may be relatively
unfamiliar to philosophers of physics, their approach and concerns have long been
the business of the human sciences. They have, however, recently become
relevant to the philosophy of science because of the dilemma mentioned above.
Scientific knowledge, like all expert knowledge, is a domain of common
meaning that finds fulfillment in the experience of local communities of
researchers sharing a common scientific culture. Knowledge such as this is
transmitted synchronically from local community to local community and also
diachronically in the historical chain of transmission and reception. What is
transmitted is not-- to use J. Dewey’s term-- a museum piece, but the product of
human understanding in action, re-creating and re-constructing meanings from the
sources of meaning that are transmitted. This process is called ‘interpretation,’
and out of it, a certain diversity of understanding is inevitable among different
local expert communities and, of course, among different generations of
researchers.
Turning in particular to historical transmission, what is handed on by past
researchers to their successors is not always what is received by these successors,
for changes occur both in the transmission of common meanings and in the
cultural matrix in which the received meanings find fulfillment. We scientists are
today Galileans in a way in which Galileo himself was not a Galilean. I am not
referring to episodic (say, Kuhnian) paradigm shifts, but to the general conditions
under which any tradition of knowledge is historically transmitted.10 Not only do
such changes occur, but they must occur in any chain of knowledge transmission,
let alone in any progressive research program. The interpretative character of
science shows itself then historically in two ways: (1) in the way the meaningfield of the lifeworld is continually being refined, replaced, or transformed by
scientific theorizing --an enterprise that is easily misconstrued if the role of
interpretation is misunderstood; and (2) in the way meaning-fulfillment in the
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lifeworld changes as the lifeworld is transformed by a succession of new
technological praxes (among them, available instrumentation) embodying new or
revised scientific theories. Of these, (1) focuses on meaning discovery,
development, and transmission; and (2) on meaning-fulfillment in experience,
culture, and perception. The continual historical dialectic between these two
transcends all monisms, and all older dualisms.11
The following discussion will be shaped by some specifically philosophical
topics and connected theses. For the purposes of this paper it is sufficient to get a
feel for what they mean, for while the hermeneutical literature is large, the part
that explicitly refers to natural science is small and needs development.
I. Lifeworld
The lifeworld is the philosophical ‘field’ (‘space’ or ‘domain’) of and for
human understanding, characterized by the action of embodied human inquirers in
communication with one another and with their environment against a
background of active cultural networks.12 Human inquirers by a species of
philosophical reflection discover themselves to be contingently ‘located’ at some
place and at some time in human history not by their choice but, as it were, as
‘having-been-thrown’ into the lifeworld conscious of having no more than a finite
lifespan (Heidegger, 1996, 63-114, 236-263). Each individual inherits a
language, a culture, a community, a set of cares-- perhaps, more than one of each- that give meaning structure and purpose to the lifeworld he or she shares, and
although the lifeworld is not of the individual’s own creation or choice, it
nevertheless permeates at conscious and unconscious levels the individual’s life
experience.
The philosophical notion of the lifeworld is derived by a special kind of
reflection from the everyday world of purposeful intelligent social activity in
which people converse with mutual understanding, conduct their business with
intelligence and forsight, resolve problems with theoretical and practical skills,
etc., all with more or less success. It would be wrong to think of the lifeworld as
perhaps explanatory of the everyday world, for it is neither a model of nor a
theory about the everyday world; nor is it merely descriptive of the everyday
world for its does not reduce to a categorial list of contents by abstract kinds. The
lifeworld is rather an attempt to show human understanding or Being at work
historically within the practical reality of the everyday world by directing our
reflective attention to the pre-theoretical, pre-predicative, 13 pre-conceptual
activity that is prior in our thinking (not temporally but as a grounding condition)
to all categories of things and institutions, and all theories of mind. What is thus
shown is Being as the ontological dimension of human experience, Being as the
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lifeworld outside of which nothing exists, and each human as being there-inBeing-- or Da-sein as Heidegger spoke
II. Interpretation and meaning
Human understanding functions by interpretation and its product is meaning.
Meaning is nothing physical; it is not a text, a behavior, a neural network, a
computation, not even a sign or a medium, nor any relationship among things,
though all of these may be generated by and productive of meaning. Nor is it a
private ‘domain’ accessible only by some kind of introspection. Rather meaning
is a public ‘domain’ where people share the products of human understanding first
by common habits of action (in which diverse networks are recognized) and then
through the use of language and language-like media. Meaning is the ‘domain’ in
which people understand one another, argue with one another, give reasons,
establish goals, set up norms, define kinds, etc.-- more or less effectively
according to the purpose, intelligence, language skills, and education of the
parties involved. Meaning is historical because language is constitutive of
history; it is also deeply affected by human temporality14 and historical
forgetfulness because the community/lifeworld milieu in which it is transmitted
has gains and losses over time; it is local and social, because it is the product of
active local interests and social communities and constitutive of their interests; it
is then neither once-and-for-all fixed, nor ever perfect and unchanging. Finally,
though subject to change under transmission, it is not on this account devoid of
truth, rather is meaning the instrument through which truthfulness makes its
appearance in the lifeworld.
III.

Scientific traditions or the historical transmission of scientific meanings

Meaning, however, is articulated and transmitted only through the medium of
language, actions, and other public expressive signs. These serve as the ‘conduit’
for meaning, but do not constitute meaning, for meaning is not a transportable
substance like bricks or water. Meanimg has to be re-created from its transmitted
sources by readers of the receiving community and there is no guarantee that the
meaning derived from these sources by readers from one community will be the
same as the meaning derived from the same resources by readers from a different
community separated from the first by history and cultural environment. As
historians of science well know, this is as true for natural science as it is for
literature and politics.
Meanings are adopted from traditions of interpretation, or constructed or reconstructed in keeping with the responsibilities, constraints, and presumptions of
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rational hermeneutical method (see below).15 One of these responsibilities is that
each legitimate meaning be appropriately fulfilled in a reader’s experience or
imagination. One of the constraints is the relative richness or poverty of the
linguistic and cultural resources available to the reader.16 One of the
presumptions is that there is no single legitimate meaning relevant to all readers
of, say, a text (and suchlike material), for meanings depend on use.17 One kind of
use that a text or sentence serves is its ability to be asserted as true in a chosen
context by a user. Contexts and uses are multiple. A text then is like any piece of
equipment,18 say, a hammer (to use Heidegger’s example), it can usually be used
successfully for several meaningful cultural purposes. The uses are not arbitrary,
for nothing but nonsense would be gained by arbitrary use, but this does not imply
that there is forever just a single legitimate meaningful use. But, as in the case of
the hammer, for each useful purpose there are lifeworld criteria as to how well a
text performs for this purpose. Again as in the case of the hammer, there may be
a conventional priority of uses with ‘ownership’ set by cultural tradition-hammers are to be used for construction, scientific results are to be used for
scientific research communities-- but no one use or ‘ownership’ need go
unchallenged either by logic or by experience nor should any one use become the
sole property of just one interested group.19
However, it is not the case that anything goes. Rational hermeneutic inquiry
acknowledges the existence of traditions of interpretation that give today’s
readers and inquirers a culturally privileged version of past sources, shaped
always to the goals of the linguistic and cultural environment of the community
with special ‘ownership’ rights in the subject matter.20 Within the sciences such
traditions of interpretation approximate to what Kuhn called ‘paradigms.’
In addition to meanings construed on the basis of a common tradition of
interpretation (with its presumption of historical continuity), legitimacy can be
gained by other meanings independently of any presumption that there exists a
historical continuity of meaning with the source through a common tradition of
life, action, and interpretation. Such discontinuities of meaning within the
sciences are at the heart of what Kuhn called ‘revolutions’ in which old
‘paradigms’ are replaced by new ones.21 In the work of hermeneutics, however, a
radically new meaning need not expel the old, because each, though different,
may be a valid historical and cultural perspective. Indeed, despite some sense of
discomfort, we often find in the sciences the old flourishing side by side with the
radically new, quantum mechanics with Newtonian mechanics, statistical
thermodynamics with phenomenological thermodynamics-- though with respect
to their formal models they are mutually incompatible-- and so on. Each acting
within its own horizon of research purposes is in dialogue with relevant data
through its own empirical processes of testing and measurement.
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The appropriate philosophical approach to the method or process of
interpretation is the ‘hermeneutical circle (or spiral).’ Briefly, following
Heidegger (Heidegger 1996, 150-151), any inquiry is initiated by the breakdown
of a task and begins by calling on the deep structure of pre-theoretical precategorial understanding22 of Being which is found in the lifeworld (Vorhabe).
Heidegger’s name for the human inquirer is ‘Da-sein’; Da-sein is ‘existence,’ the
embodied understanding of Being, a ‘there-ness’ (Da) in the domain of Being
(Sein).23 Inquiry is awakened when Da-sein poses a directed question (Vorsicht)
which, like all directed questions, already implicitly contains an outline of a
search and discovery strategy aiming at uncovering a solution. The question so
construed in this case is not yet in an articulated form; only later will it achieve an
adequate expression in (what philosophers of science call) an ‘explanation.’
There follows an active dialogue between Vorsicht and Vorhabe, accompanied by
actions seeking practical fulfillment in the awareness that the sought-for
understanding (die Sache selbst) has presented itself and made itself manifest to
the inquirer (Vorgriff). If on first trial the sought-for understanding is absent,
something nevertheless has been learnt, and the search resumes, dipping again
into the available resources of Vorhabe, Vorsicht and
Vorgriff. This
hermeneutical circle of inquiry is repeated until a solution presents itself within a
new cultural praxis in the lifeworld. Only at that time is it in order to express the
solution linguistically in the form of an explanation.
In summary, hermeneutic method is a process--and difficult work it can be-done by a current inquirer who, say, is challenged to construct a contemporary
meaning for a source event, such as, for example, Galileo’s observations on the
phases of Venus, originating in a different linguistic and cultural environment and
possibly elsewhere at an earlier time. This is the method of the hermeneutical
circle (or spiral). Interpretative work of this kind is clearly historical, cultural,
and anthropological, multidisciplinary in character and in need of a philosophical
foundation which hermeneutical philosophy tries to provide. In this work lies the
significance and power of hermeneutic method and hermeneutic philosophy for
the history and philosophy of science. And not just for these, but also for
understanding how quantitative empirical methods give meaning to empirical
contents, how theory-laden data depend on the public self-presentation of the
measured entity as a public cultural entity and, in particular, how measurement
equipment plays a double role creating and refining both theoretical and cultural
meanings. These are topics that will be addressed below.
IV. The furniture of the lifeworld
The lifeworld has a furniture that comprises those physical and embodied
cultural objects, both ‘natural,’ like trees, and ‘cultural,’ like institutions or
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technologies, which have names or descriptions in the language; among them are
perceptual objects. All of these are (to use Heidegger’s term) ontic beings.
V. Hermeneutics of theory-ladenness: theoretical understanding as explanation
Since in the age-old tradition going back to Aristotle the characteristic goal of
all scientific or scholarly inquiry is theoretical understanding, it is important to
understand what theory does in modern science. A theory explains why some
event occurs (or does not occur) by providing a model of the causes or conditions
that control its occurrence (or non-occurrence); its goal is experimental prediction
and control. Alternatively, a theory may explain a lawful regularity among
empirical events by providing a model of the causes or conditions that, if fulfilled,
necessitate the lawful regularity among these events.
To probe what is implied by this meaning of theory, I follow Heidegger
(1996, 357-364). He begins with a broken hammer and a construction project. A
hammer is a tool used in a construction project; a worker generally does not ask
what a hammer is until by bad luck he has to find a replacement for it or a
substitute. Only then he asks: what are the specifications of a hammer (so that the
project engaged in can be finished)?
The answer will be a theory (about
hammers) that explains its ability to do a hammer’s job in carpentry or the
building trades. In Carnap’s terms: the explicandum is ‘the ability to do a
hammer’s job,’ the appropriate explicans is a theory (of the hammer) which will
give physical specifications for a hammer.
Consider now the question: What meaning should a speaker attach to a
hammer? Without a specification of context, the question is indeterminate, but in
the line of our inquiry we can distinguish two questions and two answers. In the
context of a construction project, a hammer is a cultural entity possessed of a
cultural meaning related to the practical needs of carpentry and the building
trades. In the context of the explanatory project of science, the hammer is a
physical entity specified by a theory that lays out the conditions under which it
can become the host of the cultural meaning of a hammer. The first meaning is a
cultural praxis-laden meaning, and the second is a theory-laden meaning,24 and
they are not independent for the theory-laden meaning makes sense only if the
hammer-referent is in point of local contingent fact praxis-laden within the
building project either by reason of actual use or by social designation.
Despite the fact then that (hammer-) theory ‘explains’ (hammering-) praxis,
the language of theory and the language of praxis belong to different though
coordinated perspectives. Coordination does not imply, however, isomorphism
between the two perspectives,25 for the hammer could alternatively be designated
to serve as a nutcracker, and the worker on the construction project could,
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perhaps, be served on this occasion by an old boot or means other than the use of
a theoretically specified hammer. Theory, as we know, is underdetermined by
practice and vice versa.26 Since theory and praxis are merely coordinated but not
isomorphic, they can be taken as axes for a kind of cultural phase space within
which revolutionary changes can occur stemming either from theory or from
praxis. Examples of such revolutions abound. New theoretical insights can
generate new cultural practices as, for instance, when theory-based bacteria
research transforms a host of cultural practices dealing with food handling,
personal hygiene, sewage and water systems, the urban environment, and the
treatment of bacterial diseases. New cultural practices can also generate new
theories as, for instance, when the steam engine inaugurated revolutionary
changes in calorific theory leading to the development of thermodynamics. A
creative historical tension then arises in the lifeworld between theory making and
cultural practices, and this can-- and does-- result in changes in the lifeworld with
concomitant changes in the conditions for meaning-fulfillment within the
lifeworld. Noting such changes, one also notes something about the historicity of
hermeneutic truth.
Returning to an earlier point, ‘this hammer is theory-laden’ always implies an
implicit cultural hypothetical, ‘provided this hammer has been socially designated
for a hammering role in construction.’ Note that the theory-ladenness of the
hammer as such omits to include explicit reference to this local and contingent
condition, but the reference is, nevertheless, implicitly assumed by the logic of
theory as explanation. Let us consider what the case would be if this local and
contingent condition were absent. Then, ‘this’ would not be a hammer, ‘this’
would not be theory-laden, ‘this’ would become (in Heidegger’s words) ‘a mere
possible resource,’ and ‘this’ would have no more title to being listed in the
hammer category among the furniture of the then-lifeworld than old boots.27
What kind of entity then is a hammer as a socially dedicated resource? It can
only be said that it is a public cultural reality, a physical reality constituted by a
socio-cultural meaning.28
Now, to the extent that no individual thing--or almost none-- in our experience
is without a human purpose, everything in our experience, including scientific
entities, bears some resemblance to a hammer, or other tool or equipment. There
are then (at least) two perspectives on (almost) any individual thing in the
lifeworld: a praxis-laden cultural perspective and (given a successful theoretical
explanation) a theory-laden perspective.
One may argue that Carnap’s explanatory schema does more than specify
physical means to cultural ends, and aims beyond this to specify the cultureindependent reality underlying and controlling cultural life. Whether or not
explanation can go beyond culture and history is a separate assumption the basis
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of which is in metaphysics, not explanatory science. Clearly the search for
explanatory theory in the modern sense is not the same as a search for realistic
theory in the metaphysical sense despite the ancient classical assumption that
possessing theoretical knowledge is knowing the real. The debate about realism
and anti-realism is often confused about what is perceived to be at stake in
theoretical scientific research.
VI. Measurement and data
These conclusions have important consequences for understanding
measurement, since they illuminate the binary valence of empirical ‘facts,’
something not given by the usual empiricist accounts.29 The process of
measurement in science fulfills two different but coordinated functions. It
presents the object-as-measurable, this is the praxis-laden cultural function. And
it takes the data from the presented object, this is the theory-laden data-taking
function.30 These are the binary valences of scientific data. The data-taking is
usually called ‘observation’; but there is no observation without the prior
preparation and presentation of the object-as-measurable.31 A well-defined
measuring process does both jobs, presenting the object and recording the data.
These involve two different epistemological perspectives, a praxis-laden cultural
one (which belongs to the strategy of experimental culture in laboratory
environments) and a theory-laden (or explanatory) one. These two perspectives
can and should be logically, semantically, and pragmatically distinguished (see
Heidegger, 1996, 358-359). Let us consider what these two perspectives reveal
about the measuring process, scientific entities, and data.
Consider the theory-laden perspective.32 Since it is the function of theory to
oversee the experimental design (what will do the job of presenting the object-asmeasurable?), the ontic referent of theory as such is the measuring process viewed
from the construction or engineering or technical point of view. Think of the
theory of the hammer in relation to the cultural praxis of hammering! Within the
life of science, theory refers directly to the internal structure of the (particularly
measurement-presenting) processes by means of which ‘theoretical entities’ enter
the public cultural domain of science where they then provide data to observers.
This leads to a first conclusion: what is formally theory-laden is experimental
design.
In the praxis-laden cultural perspective, the presentation of the object-asmeasurable is a public cultural event praxis-laden in the scientific culture of the
laboratory, deriving meaning not from the observation event itself but from a
research program. The object-as-measurable is recognizable as such because it
comes ‘dressed’ in sensible ‘clothes’ provided by the experimental strategies
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used. Whether such ‘clothes’ render the scientific entities perceptible will be
discussed below. This leads to a second conclusion: observation events should
not be called semantically ‘theory-laden’-- this appellation should be reserved for
experimental design33-- but rather semantically praxis-laden like all dedicated or
designated cultural objects of the lifeworld presented as fulfilling experience.
The meaning of data is also bivalent and, like the meaning of a hammer,
subject to ambiguity. Data belong hypothetically to the theoretical perspective of
measurement but affirmatively to the cultural perspective of the lifeworld forum
of scientific research strategy; the research ‘narratives’ that Rouse 34 speaks about
would belong here. This is the special environment of the expert researcher and,
though public, is usually closed to the understanding and experience of the
ordinary citizen. So-called ‘theoretical entities,’ such as, for example, electrons
and electron-data, are theory-laden but, for the reasons given above, they cannot
be said to exist as such unless locatable in a public forum, the primary public
forum being that of an experimental scientific research program where as public
cultural entities they are explicitly praxis-laden with respect to some standard
configuration(s) of laboratory equipment. Though the theory of electrons may
change, it is never the case that what we call ‘an electron’ fails to have an in
principle relationship to contingent local practical cultural milieus.
VII. Theoretical entities as cultural entities
In addition to the public forum of scientific research, there are other public
fora within which individual ‘theoretical entities’ and the data about them can
become cultural entities.35 These are, for example, public fora featuring
technology, finance, political power, religion, art, media, and so on. All of these-like the scientific research forum itself-- are local fora in which a scientific entity,
usually in some technological context, can play the role of a dedicated cultural
resource (for the life of finance, politics, religion, art, media, etc) and by this
means become part of the local furniture of the lifeworld. For example, choosing
television as one such local technological forum, then, electrons-- or, at least,
electron-beams-- can be designated even to children and others unlettered in
physics as cultural entities in that forum because of their role in ‘painting’ the TV
picture. In all such local fora, the scientific entity and its data are meaningfully
bivalent and emulate the relationship between theory and praxis in the study of a
hammer. Removed from all such local fora the putative ‘data’ are not data at all36
since they do not make manifest in the lifeworld the presence of anything but
‘themselves’-- but of ‘themselves,’ having no determinate lifeworld meaning,
they are just noise.
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When new theory-based technologies are added to the lifeworld, theoretical
scientific terms can be introduced into everyday descriptive language with new
non-theoretical cultural meanings. For instance, temperature as a cultural entity
is endowed with non-theoretical, practical lifeworld meanings which can be used
to create, designate, employ, and control new classes of equipment, for example,
thermostats, in the lifeworld. With the help of these new resources, the old
cultural environment can be changed, perhaps, in revolutionary ways. Public
space, for example, was revolutionized in renaissance Italy in the quattrocento
prior to the Copernican revolution and the development of modern science when
it came to be subjected to universal measurement, and to analysis according to the
principles of the newly discovered mathematical perspective. It was transformed
by this process, from a manifold with diverse local geometries into one with a
single measurement-based Euclidean geometry. For those who looked for a
unified cosmology, the way was prepared for Galileo and the Copernican
revolution.37
The second example is from medicine and illustrates how the bivalence of
scientific descriptions can create new moral perplexities in the lifeworld. Duden38
asks, is the term ‘foetus,’ merely a scientific redescription of the lifeworld entity,
a baby? Or is it the replacement of one lifeworld entity, a baby, by a new
scientific entity, a foetus? The terms are, of course, correlative (each in its own
context reveals something about what the other term refers to) but they are not
isomorphic (there is no unique mapping from one to the other). But a foetus is
something that the medical profession alone can discern and control with its
sonographical and other techniques apart from the mother; a baby is what the
mother knows by feeling it within her, defining it in terms of her own familial
response to it. Duden then asks, should ethics and legislation, say, concerning
pregnancies, be written exclusively in terms of the foetus, as one finds
increasingly in the current practice in the West? Or should the difference between
the two perspectives be recognized and an accomodation found that defers to the
special cultural role of the mother in decision-making about the baby?
Beyond the life of science then ‘theoretical entities’ are recognized as public
cultural entities through the technologies that embody them and through the
public data that monitor their part in the way these technologies work.
Theoretical entities then are not extra-cultural extra-historical entities, but to the
contrary their theory-ladenness implicitly binds them, not just to the arcane
culture of scientific research, but also to the broader cultural historical lifeworld
wherever their presence is recognized in public experience. Removed (in
principle) from the lifeworld, they are simply non-entities.
VIII. Truth and meaning
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Truth in the classical sense grasped the object’s inner intelligibility leaving
behind what was material, irregular, and unintelligible; it was the immaterial
(mental, spiritual, intentional) possession of a material object leaving it, however,
unchanged. The mental representation so formed conformed to the object
represented, it ‘mirrored’ Nature in Mind. Language and life did not enter into
the shaping of what is so presented as truth. Powerful and historically significant
as was the classical notion of truth, there came a time, however, when the
function of language eventually could not be ignored. Tarski, for instance,
proposed to define truth as a property of statements. Thus, let ‘p’ (‘Snow is
white’) be a statement, then: ‘p’ (‘Snow is white’) is true if and only if p (snow is
white). From the hermeneutic perspective such an account turns out either to beg
the question or to be vacuous. For consider: how is the meaning of the sentence
‘p’ (‘Snow is white’) arrived at? Words to be meaningful need a context of use
and a users’ community, but there are an infinite variety of contexts of use and of
users’ communities for the sentence ‘p’ (‘Snow is white’) giving different
meanings, yet none is specified in Tarski’s definition. Turning to the other half of
the definition, how is it determined that p (snow is white)? By experience, of
course! But either experience presupposes an ability to use language correctly
which begs the question or is indeterminate and so cannot function as a criterion.
Tarski’s logical definition, however, was proposed within a philosophical
framework different from the one used in this paper and within that framework
was unquestioned until recently.
In the hermeneutical perspective, truth is the product of a human
understanding that works through interpretation.
Interpretation, however,
functions through the construction of meaning by common action, theory, and
language. Theoretical meanings contribute an abstract component and common
action contributes a cultural or practical component.
Heidegger embodied this duality of meaning in his choice of the Greek term,
alethia (literally ‘uncovering’) for truth (Heidegger, 1996, 213-4). It signalled a
change in the notion of truth from the classical model of full transparency to
human understanding, towards one of only partial, historical, local, practical, or
contextual transparency (see, for example, Heidegger, 1996, 34-39).39 As in the
case of the hammer, the theoretical set of parameters addresses just one aspect of
the individual exemplars, that chosen for explanation (the explicandum). Other
aspects of the exemplars than those chosen for explanation are outside of the
perview of the inquiry.
Moreover, in the search to explain the explicandum, the theorizing process
soon discovers the extent to which the cultural function of the explicandum can be
transferred to different artifacts from the individual exemplars originally studied.
An old boot can on occasion do the work of a hammer! This leads to the
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following (surprising?) conclusion: what makes this or any individual hammer to
be a hammer--or what makes this or any individual thing in human experience to
be what it is perceived to be-- is not a defining permanent essence but a set of
contextual properties any one of which can be found in, or retro-fitted for, a
variety of different physical hosts.
The truth about things in the lifeworld then is not a classical conformity
between a mental representation and the object represented but a property of
complex meanings with local and historical uses.40 The meanings we entertain
about things are disclosed by praxes that are implicitly theory-laden. These
meanings are not permanent but historical, local, and changing. They are local,
because expert communities of use are exclusive. They are changing because, it
happens that, when the particular theory-ladenness of the praxes becomes explicit,
new, better or, at least, different, praxes can often be engineered with a
consequent transformation of cultural meaning. It can happen, say, that some old
boots function as hammers, or that hammers eventually disappear entirely in a
world of plastics and high tech. Such a spiral of meaning change turns endlessly
within the historicality of Being (see Heidegger, 1996, 9) as such trivial examples
show. Such a process of theory-driven cultural change brings new historical
perspectives into play and through forgetfulness inevitably puts old ones out of
play. The big mistake of modernity was to commit itself to a classical static
conformity notion of truth that could only be retained by supposing that scientific
theory could be separated logically or ontologically from temporality and culture.
This is what hermeneutic reflection shows to be contrary to experience.41
IX.

Scientific technologies

Heidegger feared that, to the extent that scientific inquiry is successful in the
construction of explanatory theories, it would turn the focus of philosophical
inquiry away from ‘meditative thinking’ about the lifeworld as the cultural arena
for human life fulfillment, that is, away from meaning and meaning change, and
toward (what Aristotle called) ‘calculative thinking’ ordained toward management
and control; in the latter, things are treated as means to ends within Gestell, the
assumed ‘objective’ frame of ‘objective reality’ (Heidegger, 1968, pp. 3-35; 1966,
p. 46).
No minimizing is intended, however, of the great benefits that can and do
flow from the ‘calculative thinking’ of scientific inquiry. Nevertheless,
Heidegger foresaw that such benefits could have a human cost, for they affect the
way cultural life teaches people to be human and communicates to them the sense
of the wholeness, integrity, and goodness of the world, the self, and human
communities. This is Duden’s point (in the example cited above) in questioning
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the implication of using the scientific term ‘foetus’ exclusively in place of the
older maternally related vocabulary. Changing the traditional vehicles for the
transmission of these core meanings inevitably changes how people regard
themselves, their personal destinies, their neighbors, and the world around, with
consequent risks of cultural instability in all these areas.42
X.

‘Theoretical entities’ as perceptual entities

It was argued above that ‘theoretical scientific entities’ are public cultural
entities. Among the latter are perceptual entities. Is it possible that some
‘theoretical entities’ are also perceptual entities?
Much depends on what perceptual objects are taken to be. In the empiricist
tradition perceptual objects are explained as organizations of sensations, and from
this position it can be argued that sensations received from a measuring
instrument can only be ingredients of the scientist’s perception of the state change
of the instrument, and not of the ‘theoretical entity’ that caused that change. In a
more developed version of empiricism, an argument is sometimes made for the
partial observability of the ‘theoretical entity’.43 This whole line of thinking
derives from a theory or model of perception-- one incidentally that has little
supporting evidence-- and when applied to the perceptual object itself as a cultural
phenomenon, it makes no sense at all. The perceptual object is the explicandum
and should not be confused with the empiricist explicans.44 Nevertheless, the
empiricist theory of perception exercises an influence far beyond its weight in
discussions about the ontological status of ‘theoretical entities.’
What then are perceptual objects as phenomena in the lifeworld? A brief
sketch of an answer would go something like this: they are substantive
individually localized cultural objects in the lifeworld, presented to local human
perceivers in sensory experience, and understood by the character, multiplicity,
and systematicity of their sensory presentations or profiles. 45 Given that (on the
basis of the argment already made) a scientific ‘theoretical entity,’ say, an
electron, is a substantive cultural entity in the lifeworld, we ask: can it have the
appearance of a perceptual object? The answer I gave in an earlier work is Yes!
and this answer still holds.46 Let me revisit the question briefly.
In section VII, I referred to the historical influence in the quattrocento of two
technologies, distance measurement and mathematical perspective, on public
space transforming it from a diversity of local and mostly non-Euclidean public
spaces to one universal Euclidean public space. Such technologies as those
mentioned above I called ‘readable technologies,’ because they made it possible
to make and mark environmental cues that enabled the learning of Euclidean
vision. In general, readable technologies are technologies capable of transforming
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perception.47 Some laboratory measurement devices when standardized have the
capacity of presenting a cultural entity, such as, for example, an electron or a
molecule, as localized in the lifeworld and as ‘clothed’ with systematic sensory
profiles that can be taken in context as an electron’s recognizable signature. Such
technologies are readable technologies and confer perceptability on the scientific
entity in question.
XI.

Contextual Logic and Bivalent and Multivalent meanings

Tools, such as, for example, hammers, and practically everything else in the
lifeworld including ‘theoretical entities’ have multivalent meanings.
By
‘multivant meanings,’ I mean, a minimum of two synchronic meanings in
different, coordinated but not isomorphic, perspectives that are descriptive of a
public cultural entity. Such perspectival multivalence raises the further question:
Are there articulate logically reasonable conditions (within the purview of
hermeneutical philosophy) that would give coherence to such perspectives?
The answer I gave in an earlier work is still fundamentally the one I would
give today though with some corrective glosses.48 The core of the solution is that
the two complementary perspectival languages-- theory-laden and praxis-laden-must be partially ordered by statement inclusion within a complemented nondistributive lattice (or context logic).49
XII.

The scope of hermeneutical philosophy for the philosophy of science

The hermeneutic turn in the philosophy of science is necessary to study
aspects of science for which the traditional philosophy of science is not well
equipped. These are the dynamic, narrative, historical, and lifeworld aspects of
science. In this light the traditional philosophy of science appears to be a version
aimed at fulfilling the cultural goal of supporting theoretical research with a
strong interest in management and control, and as a philosophy it is cropped of
much of its background in human life and history that is relevant for broader and
longer term issues.50
The wider scope of a hermeneutical philosophy of science can be judged by
the topics it needs to address, some of which I and others have already begun to
address in publications.
1. Scientific discovery, or how traditions begin, needs to be studied in
individual exemplary cases, such as Galileo’s telescopic observations of Venus or
Heisenberg’s quantum mechanical explanation of the hydrogen atom. The
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appropriate philosophical approach and method is that of the ‘hermeneutical
circle’ as sketched above
2. Meaning persistence or change needs to be studied in the process of
transmission of a scientific tradition under ordinary and extraordinary conditions
of diverse and changing cultural and theoretical interests.51
3. The role of metaphor52 needs to be studied; metaphor is as fundamental for
the hermeneutical perspective as literality is for traditional philosophies of
science. Since theory is mathematical and the lifeworld is empirical, it makes no
sense to predicate abstract and mathematical theoretical properties literally of the
lifeworld; at best, the two come together in some unambiguous way in a variety of
authoritative contexts each comprised of experts, guided by (what Aristotle
called) ‘phronesis,’ and conscious that they are seeking a consensus about a set of
relevant soluble issues. Among these authoritative contexts the scientific
discipline has a certain privilege of ‘ownership’; it might be called the ‘producer
ownership,’ others in contrast being ‘user ownership,’ though the notions of
‘intellectual ownership’ and ‘use’ as they relate to science is a matter that is not to
be resolved here. One last important comment: underlying the literalist view are a
series of cropped understandings (misunderstandings?) of the nature and role of
mathematical models, for instance, of how theories relate to the empirical world,
of the nature of truth, and particularly, of knowledge as only a short term causal
objective snapshot in contrast with knowledge as long term dynamic, historical,
and social assessments that function of necessity in a cultural milieu that, being
praxis-laden, does not need or support unlimited univocity, precision, or
causality.53
4. The role of metaphor in the history of science is revealed as a powerful
source for shaping theory and needs to be studied. Images of perfectly smooth
balls, perfect elastic bands, imponderable aethers, frictionless mechanical devices,
‘molecular’ bench models, ideal computer simulations, sine-wave oscillators, tendimensional spaces, and God’s Mind’s Eye on Nature have all helped to shape
scientific theories. Nor is it possible to come to understand, say, modern physics
or biology, without passing through stages of metaphor in the learning process.
As in the search for theory, so in its application, theoretical instruments apply to
real situations in socially negotiated ways, using metaphors.
5. How scientific traditions end needs to be studied from the hermeneutic
perspective. Kuhn and others argue that the abandonment of a tradition is not
simply a function of having failed the challenge of anomalies, but of a decision of
those who principally ‘own’ the tradition to make the tradition vulnerable to
challenges. Resistance to such a move is strong, because what keeps a tradition
alive is usually some transcendental good it offers or some hope beyond the
particular useful solutions it has generated. That good could be mythic or
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aesthetic. A mythic good is religious in nature, connected with the notion of
theory as a sharing in divine or transcendental knowledge54; this is the spiritual
good that Galileo, Newton, and Einstein sought in their science. Alternatively, it
could be an aesthetic good like the styles of art, music, and cuisine that is
connected with the fulfillment of human embodied activity in the world; this is a
good associated more with laboratory virtuosity than with disembodied
spirituality55 ; one thinks of some great experimenters, a Pasteur or a Fermi, in this
connection.
6. How myth as a grand narrative, understood as normative, metaphorical,
and metaphysical,56 operates in the transmission of scientific traditions needs to
be studied in particular cases. For example, the historical Galileo and today’s
physicists share something associated with the term ‘Galilean,’ but today’s
physicists are ‘Galilean’ more in a mythic than a historical sense.
7. While we do not ask of a philosophy that it contribute to the successful
practice of science, science nevertheless continually throws up philosophical
questions that divide the scientific community and constrain or limit its energies
in a world of finite resources. A survey of recent literature57 suggests that many
currently frustrating and contentious topics should be looked at through the optic
of hermeneutical philosophy. Some of these are epistemological or metaphysical
framework topics, such as, for example, realism, relativism, constructivism, truth,
objectivity, causality, purpose, and history, and some are issues that call for
liaison with the lifeworld, such as, for example, space, localization, time,
measurement, data, explanation, macroscopic and
microscopic, elementary
particles, multivalence of scientific claims, indeterminacy, and the paradoxes of
quantum physics.58
8. Since theory-based technologies can change the lifeworld and the range of
possible meanings available to human life and action, hermeneutical philosophy
should ask: in what way does a changing lifeworld change the playing field for
science, old or new?
9. Science also throws up epistemological questions regarding
interdisciplinary studies of science; communities of historians, philosophers,
sociologists, cultural anthropologists, etc. are deeply troubled by their inability to
communicate well among themselves.59 A common platform in a hermeneutic
philosophy of science might ease this situation by disclosing the different agendas
and different fundamental resources (in texts, technologies, cultural habits, etc.)
that define these disciplines in relation to the differing perspectives they engage in
a postmodern lifeworld.
10. An important focus of interest for hermeneutical philosophy is the
empirical social, cognitive, psychological, neurobiological, and medical sciences,
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where a profusion of theoretical models vie with each other and conflict with the
way people understand themselves in their own cultural practices. 60
11. On the ethical front, questions like, ‘how does scientific theory, say, in
medical science, relate to the lifeworld of cultural experience, say, a woman’s
pregnancy?’ need to be treated hermeneutically. It is often assumed that scientific
theory should replace the ‘folk wisdom’ of human culture61: but that is by no
means evident.
12. On the religious and political front where hermeneutic methods are
strongest, there is need for a more hermeneutical account of science’s public role
as the principal agency of theoretical knowledge within a culture that is in great
need of such knowledge, has such great respect for it, but is racked by deep
uneasiness about its often implicit cultural agenda. 62
13. Finally, returning to Heisenberg’s description of quantum mechanics as a
re-interpretation of classical mechanics, the writer has confidence that a
hermeneutical analysis in the spirit of this paper would go far to throw light on the
basic ‘mysteries’ of the quantum theory. 63
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NOTES
1. See Heisenberg (1925, 1977); cf also Heelan (1965, 1975a).
2. The polarity between the methods of the human and natural sciences, that is, between hermeneutic
(Verstehen) and explanatory (Verklären) method, has been the subject of many studies, from
Dilthey to Gadamer. To mention a few: Dilthey (1989), Follesdal (1979), Gadamer (1975, 1988),
Margolis (1987, 1996). The concern of this essay, namely, to address the explanatory method of the
natural sciences from the philosophical perspective of hermeneutic philosophy, is shared with,
among others, Babich (1994), Bubner (1975), Crease (1995), Eger (1993), Feleppa (1981), Fjelland
(1991), Gadamer (1982), Hübner (1983), Kockelmans (1985, 1993), Markus (1987), Ricoeur (1978,
1981), Rouse (1987), Scharff (1995), and the present writer, e.g. Heelan (1965, 1975b, 1983a/1988,
1987a, 1987b). Many important writers, including Gadamer, Apel, and Habermas, are too imbued
with the classical view of natural science as uniquely explanatory that for historical-- and perhaps,
also practical-- reasons characterizes the culture of empirical research to be open exponents of a
hermeneutic philosophy of natural science. This essay then will draw mostly from Heidegger and
his commentators.
3. Cf. Dilthey (1989); and among other works, Bleicher (1980, 1982), Heelan (1991, 1994).
4. See Kuhn (1970, 1977), Fleck (1935/1979), Crombie (1994), and others.
5. See, for example, the work of B. Barnes, D. Bloor, H. Collins, M. Jacob, B. Latour, A. Pickering,
and S. Shapin, as well as the monumental work of Crombie (1994).
6. Among the scholars in this field to whom I implicitly refer in this paper are N. Cartwright, I.
Hacking, M. Hesse, K. Popper, H. Putnam, W. Quine, W. Sellars, van Fraassen, and J. Ziman.
7. See, for example, how Cartwright (1983) and Earman (1992) address some of these questions.
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8. For an overview of the tradition see, for example, Bleicher (1980, 1982), Heelan (1983a/1988),
Kockelmans (1993). The German tradition is covered Mueller-Vollmer (1994) which contains
brief bibliographies. Some of the basic works of the authors mentioned are listed among the
references.
9. Among the many excellent commentaries on Heidegger and the hermeneutic tradition are
Bernasconi (1993), Buckley (1992), Dreyfus (1991), Grondin (1994, 1995), Guignon (1983),
Gurwitsch (1966), Kisiel (1993), Kockelmans (1985, 1993), Mueller-Vollmer (1994), Okrent
(1988), Pöggeller (1987), and Richardson (1963).
10. Crombie’s and Shapin’s work illustrate this approach.
11. Recognition should be given to P. Feyerabend for drawing attention to Reason’s difficulty-Reason being theoretical science and the philosophy of science-- in attempting to make sense of the
richly varied real life historical circumstances in which scientific theory grows and from which it
has sought to exercise hegemony over thought. See, for example, Feyerabend (1987). Much of this
material needs to be re-assessed in a different philosophical setting, a more hermeneutical one, from
the one he was familiar with.
12. The notion of lifeworld was used by Heidegger (1996), Husserl (1970), Merleau-Ponty (1962),
Schutz (1973), Heelan (1983a/1988) and others; it plays an important role in the tradition of
hermeneutic philosophy.
13. Cf also Heidegger (1996), 354-364.
14. Also influenced by human temporality are, for example, C. Hooker, R. Neville, A. Shimony, M.
Wartofsky, and others working in an evolutionary naturalistic perspective; see Hahlweg and Hooker
(1989). As in the tradition of pragmatic philosophy of which this is an extension, the energy of
discovery comes from action which, like hermeneutics, presupposes a certain priority for the Good.
15. Cf for example, Heidegger (1996), 150-151 (on the ‘hermeneutical circle’), Dilthey (1989),
Gadamer (1975), and, say, as exemplified in Toulmin (1992).
16. For example, our current resources may be poorer than the past to understand, say, the term,
‘magic,’ while for the term ‘disease,’ our current resources may be richer--or, at least, different.
17. See Heelan (1991, 1994) for the dependency of meaning on an assumed fundamental corpus of
literary resources, as exemplified, say, by a shelf of books in the library.
18. See Heidegger (1996),357-364.
19. There is a vibrant and copious cross-disciplinary literature about historical, religious, ethical,
political, and other cultural meanings of topics ranging from Big Bang Cosmology to ethical aspects
of science. Among the scientist contributors to these discussions are Stephen Hawking, Steven
Weinberg, Paul Davies, and Richard Dawkins. The non-scientists include, for example, ethicians,
historians, sociologists, and cultural anthropologists of science, and feminists.
20. Such traditions of interpretation tend to possess from the short term perspective a static quality that
from the long term perspective shows up as an inauthenticity to be overcome for the sake of growth
of knowledge; cf. Heidegger (1996), 9.
21. For the study of scientific revolutions, see Kuhn (1970), and the extensive literature that followed
the publication of this work; in particular, Lakatos/Musgrave (1970), Gutting (1980), HoyningenHuene (1993). Paradigm revolutions are also associated with the temporality of the human knower
and communities of knowers, cf. Heidegger (1996), 372-373.
22. Readers may find some difficulty with the meaning of this language. It attempts to direct thinking
to the foundations of every articulation of human experience in the lived understanding of the
lifeworld, antecedent (in principle) to the formation of perceptual kinds (of things, events, etc.) and
their representations in language or language-like signs. I have translated Vorhabe as lifeworld
background, Vorsicht as proposed theory, and Vorgriff as looked-for fulfillment in experience or
experiment.
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23. This may be expressed in a hermeneutical principle: the Being of understanding is the
understanding of Being. The object of understanding-- “die Sache selbst” --necessarily belongs to
Being. This may be looked upon as the hermeneutical joining of an upward movement which is the
search for understanding (Vorhabe; see below) and a downward movement resulting in the selfmanifestation of that (die Sache selbst) which is articulated by theory (Vorsicht) and given in
experience (Vorgriff).
24. The term, ‘theory-laden’ was first used by N.R. Hanson against the empiricist view of scientific
observation; he argued that scientific observations were theory-laden; see Hanson (1961)-- there is
more about this below.
25. By isomorphism is meant a one-to-one translatability of any statement in one language into a
unique statement in the other language. The two context-dependent languages refer to the same
things but from different, often interacting and mutually interfering, perspectives. I have argued
that these languages are related among themselves within a lattice structure which includes a least
upper bound (lub) and a greatest lower bound (glb) as well as complements. This thesis is
presented in Heelan (1983a/1988), chaps. 10 and 13.
26. This is the Duhem or Quine-Duhem Thesis, arrived at by another route; cf. Duhem (1914/1954).
27. ‘This’ former hammer could now possibly be a museum-piece, but more likely it is junk.
28. The socio-cultural meaning then is not something that can be dropped, like slag from ore when a
metal is refined, but essential to the intelligibility of the meaning. For an understanding of cultural
meaning, see Geertz (1973, 1983).
29. Empiricist accounts of measurement are legion; many of them have purposes that are not strictly
philosophical but methodological. Philosophers of science have also written on measurement but
mostly from the viewpoint that empirical measures are grounded in ideal, objective, in the short
term unique, and realistic values. For a hermeneutic view on measurement and data, see Heelan
(1989a). For its background in Heidegger, see (1996), 357-364.
30. In physics, these are sometimes called ‘preparation’ or ‘measurement of the first kind’ and
‘observation’ or ‘measurement of the second kind’ respectively. See Heelan (1983a/1988), chap.
11. and Heelan (1983b, 1989a, 1992).
31. This is a point also made by Hacking (1983) but from a different perspective.
32. What follows comes from a further exploration and correction of Hanson’s “theory-ladenness,” and
is also in part a critique of Fjelland (1991).
33. How this analysis applies to a ‘closed’ system, that is, one that is not interacting with its
environment, needs further study. The study of ‘closed’ and ‘open’ systems within this context
involves also a study of the space/time notions of ‘body,’ e.g., a body’s ‘spatial boundaries,’ its
‘size,’ ‘mass,’ ‘quantity,’ etc. and how the notions of ‘macroscopic’ and ‘microscopic’ apply. Some
of these have been partially addressed in recent literature, e.g., see Needham (1996) and the
references he gives, but these studies are against a philosophical background that is object- and
concept-oriented. None of these analyses addresses satisfactorily how the meaning of these terms
relate to a body’s lifeworld engagement, say, in measurement.
34. Rouse (1996), p. 27 and in chap. 9.
35. For the notion of culture, cf. Geertz (1973, 1983).
36. Of course, there is always an alternative strategy, the researcher may re-evaluate the interpretative
context of the experiment and pursue another goal. For a more detailed study of data, see Heelan
(1989a, 1992), also (1983a/1988).
37. See Heelan (1983a/1988), chap. 11.
38. The example that follows was taken from Duden (1993).
39. Polanyi seems to say the same in different terms: the explicit meaning conceals a tacit meaning; see
Polanyi (1964), pp. x-xi.
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40. Radder (1996) who comes to a similar conclusion.
41. These conclusions prepare the ground for Babich’s reading of Nietzsche’s philosophy of science
(Babich 1994) in which she explores with elegance Nietzsche’s perspectivalism or musical
“concinnity” in relation to truth, morality, and the critique of science.
42. Contrast the views of Bly (1996) and Vattimo (1992) about the post-modern effects of the
dismantling of Enlightenment culture. As David Bromwich wrote in a review of the former in The
New Republic, September 9 & 23, 1996, ‘... progress for [Americans] means almost exclusively
technological improvement ... But all the new tools a people master cannot assure their generous
use. Technology travels a different road from political stability, moral well-being or aesthetic
achievement...’ (p. 34). See also, Duden (1993), for a feminist perspective. Also Heelan
(1983a/88), chap. 15.
43. Such as, for example, made by Fraassen (1980).
44. This confusion can arise from the common but mistaken conception that the value of a theoretical
variable is to be identified with the ideal or limiting value obtained by ever more precise
measurements. Such a conception does not work, as Kant indicated, for any singular theoretical
value must be postulated a priori. Neither can it be uniquely derived inductively from an empirical
series. Moreover, as the argument above shows, empirical data belong to the domain of the
culturally manifested object (the explicandum) while the theoretical values belong to the
mathematical model of the measurement process (the explicans).
45. For a more technical account, influenced by Gibson (1979) and Husserl (1948/1973, 1970), of what
constitutes a phenomenological perceptual entity, see Heelan (1983a/1988, 1985, 1986, 1987b).
46. Heelan (1983a/1988, 1986, 1997b).
47. For the transformation of public space in renaissance Italy, see Heelan (1983a/1988), chap. 6; for
other relevant comments, see chapter 11. Putting the emphasis on the transformation of perception
effected by instruments, this philosophy is ‘horizonal realism’; putting the emphasis on the
hermeneutical character of the processes of discovery and recognition in physics, this philosophy is
‘hermeneutical realism.’ I have used both designations. For the hermeneutic aspect of
experimentation, see Heelan (1975b, 1983a/1988, 1983b, 1989a, 1992).
48. See Heelan (1983a/1988), chaps. 10 and 13, which is based on Heelan (1970). The glosses would
correct the interpretation of the language lattice in the light of the more developed doctrine of this
paper. The author intends to revisit this topic in another work.
49. The author has used context logic to articulate the sense of complementarity in the quantum theory.
Data in the empirical social sciences are also subject to complementarity conditions, which suggests
that theories of the quantum type and context logic might be useful in the social science domain.
See Heelan (1995, 1997a).
50. This is the substance of Feyerabend’s critique of the culture of science in Feyerabend (1987).
51. The recent history of science contains a wealth of material available for this study. Among recent
publications should be noted the magisterial work of Crombie (1994). On the historicity of
meaning, see Fiumara (1995).
52. For a profound discussion of metaphor and model, see Fiumara (1995); also Hesse and Arbib
(1986). From the side of linguistics and discourse analysis, see Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and
Johnson (1987).
53. Some brief reflections on the limits of precision: the chaos situation in physics is an anti-Cartesian
phenomenon that arises when the unlimited precision of a theory in mapping inputs and outputs
breaks down (fails in relation to the cultural scientific goal of control), as when small changes in
practice produce large and uncontrollable outcomes. Perhaps, a like anti-Cartesian phenomenon
occurs in dielectical discourse when unlimited clarity is pursued to a point where the overall cultural
point of the discourse (better understanding? control over the discourse?) is no longer attainable.
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On the side of the social studies of science Latour (1987) seems to be most aware of this impasse.
Cf., for example, Heelan (1965, 1970, 1975a, 1975b, 1987b).
54. Kuhn (1970) hints at this view. Myth is an animating force at the level of deepest human
commitments and its presence in a scientific tradition would confer on it a greater degree of nobility
than would be accounted for if theory were just explanatory.
55. The view is defended by Heelan (1989a) and Crease (1995).
56. See Fiumara (1995), pp. 52, 61, 75.
57. How frustrating these topics are can be read from the literature, for example, Earman (1992), Hesse
and Arbib (1986), Cartwright (1983), and the feminist writers in critique of science.
58. See, for example, Bell (1987), Cartwright (1983).
59. See Nickles (1995).
60. Some of the key areas are in the theoretical modelling of intelligence, perception, and decisionmaking. There is a large literature that addresses these questions from a variety of philosophical
perspectives, but only a small proportion bases itself on hermeneutic philosophy. For a hermeneutic
study of perception, see Heelan (1983a/1988, 1983c, 1985, 1986).
61. See Duden (1993).
62. Witness the current ‘science wars’ and the lamentable misunderstandings on all sides. From the
science side, see Horgan (1996), Gross and Levitt (1994); from the science studies side, see Social
Text, Spring/Summer 1996 and Lingua Franca, May/June and July/August 1996. For one account
of the underlying tensions, see D. Nelkin (1996) and see also the responses it generated.
63. Among these are the Uncertainty Principle, and problems about localization, causality, the
observer’s role in measurement, and the paradoxes of macroscopic quantum phenomena as
illustrated, say, by Schrödinger’s Cat, the EPR Paradox, and Bell’s Inequality.
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